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Abstract-A new approach to the problem of a group ranking is presented. The solution satisfies 
four of Arrow’s six axioms [1,2] and ls sufficient for a wide range of applications. A constructive 
algorithm is proposed for finding a group ranking on the basis of individual rankings of which some 
may collide with others. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The basic model of knowledge engineering is based on teamwork in which a knowledge engineer 
mediates between human experts and the knowledge base. The knowledge engineer elicits knowl- 
edge from the experts, refines it with them, and represents it in the knowledge base. Oddly 
enough, the problem of a group ranking has not been explored deeply enough. Arrow’s impossi- 
bility theorem (see [1,2]) p roves that no solution exists under general assumptions (see Section 4). 
However, a constructive algorithm exists under modified (but still practical) assumptions. One 
such algorithm is presented in this paper, which is an extended and refined version of [3]. 
Let us assume that there is a finite set X of objects (e.g., criteria or stimuli) and m experts, 
numbered 1,2, . . . , m. Each expert i compares objects and constructs a nonempty zoealc order 
<i g X x X. The problem of a group ranking is to define one group ranking, c9 c X x X, which 
is a “compromise” based on all of the individual rankings IR = {<I,. . . , <m}. It is possible that 
some of the individual rankings may collide with other individual rankings. The group ranking <s 
is expected to be a weak order, but it should be somehow consistent with most (if not all) of the 
individual rankings IR. 
Various instances of the above problem occur in the Social Choice Theory, Decision Making 
Process and Knowledge-Based Systems (see [1,2,4,5] and many others). Also a similar problem, 
but with quite different consistency rules, occurs in the Theory of Concurrency, where <i rep- 
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resents individual equivalent observations and <9 is a ‘concurrent history’ (see [S]). Compliance 
with the consistency rules is crucial since the Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [1,2] says that under 
certain assumptions (called Arrow’s Axioms; see, for example, [2]) the above formulated problem 
has no general solution. Needless to say, a constructive solution should be of interest to both 
theoreticians and practitioners. 
Approximation of discrete relations by preference orders reduces disorder and randomness in 
judgements. This is useful for any inference tool applicable to knowledge-based systems. It is 
easier to implement and use partial orders which may be programmed (in most instances) as a 
block of iJ,f-the-else, switch, or case constructs (in some programming languages). 
In this paper, we present a range of fairly general solutions satisfying four of Arrow’s six 
axioms. They are, in our opinion, sufficient for a wide range of applications. In particular, 
the solutions presented may be successfully applied to knowledge-based systems and used in the 
decision making process. 
2. RANKING RELATIONS AND PREFERENCE ORDERS 
A relation < C: X x X is called a (sharp) partial order if it is irreflexive and transitive, i.e., 
if a < b + Tb < a, and a < b < c =S a < c, for all a, b,c E X. We will write a N b if 
la<bATb<aAa#b(wherel denotes not), that is if a and b are distinct incomparable 
elements of X. A partial order is: 
a total if N is empty, i.e., for all a, b E X. a < b V b < a, 
l weak [7] if a - b - c + a - c V a = c, i.e., if N U idx is an equivalence relation (idx is an 
identity on X). 
Evidently, every total order is weak. A wide and complete analysis of axioms for preference 
and indifference relations is presented in [2]. It is worthwhile noting that in the majority of cases 
the preference relation is just a weak order, while indifference corresponds to N U idx. In some 
cases (such as concurrency theory, see [6]), it is more realistic to model preferences by semiorders 
or interval orders [7]. However, here we assume that preference is modeled by weak orders. The 
charm of weak orders is that they can be represented uniquely by value functions (compare, for 
example, [2]). M ore formally, a partial order < C X x X is weak if and only if there is a total 
order <t c Y x Y, and a mapping (value function) 21 : X + Y, such that a < b e v(a) <t v(b). 
Weak orders can easily be represented by step-sequences. For instance, if X = {a, b, c, d, e}, and 
w(a) = u(c) = 0, w(e) = 2, v(b) = v(d) = 5, then the weak order < is uniquely represented by the 
step-sequence {a, c}{e}{b, d} (see [6]). 
The first step in our approach is to define and construct a ranking relation. 
Let X be our set of objects to be ranked and IR = {<I,. . . , <m} be the set of individual 
(weakly ordered) rankings. By a (binary) ranking relation over the set IR, we mean any relation 
R C X x X satisfying the following constraints: 
l Vx.y E X. ]{i / x ci y}] 2 I{i 1 y <$ x}] + ~yRx, and 
o Vx,y E X. (Vi = I,. . . ,m. x <i yj + xRy, 
where for every set A, IAl denotes the number of elements of A. 
An obvious example of a ranking relation is R,,,, simple majority voting relation, where 
xRsmvy H I{i lx <i ~11 > Iii I Y -G ~11, 
i.e., xRsmvy if more experts preferred y over x. The relation l&,, exists for every IR, and every 
ranking relation over IR satisfies R C R,,,. R,,, is not, however, the only ranking relation one 
may think of. If, for instance, 10 experts would say IC is better than y, and 11 just the opposite, 
the ranking that x and y are of the same value seems to be the most appropriate in many cases 
(except for sports and politicsl). 
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In general, one would consider the value of I{i 1 z <i y}I - j{i 1 y <i z}I to establish the relation 
between 2 and y. If it is “big,” we assume xRy. For “small” or “very small,” we would rather 
assume that 7xRy and 1yRx. Note that in both cases 7yRx. 
The second condition says that if all experts prefer y over x, then the entire group does, so xRy. 
The relation R is always irreflexive, i.e., 7xRx. 
If, by chance, the relation R is a weak order, our goal has been achieved. Unfortunately, the 
relation R may not even be a partial order. The precise definition of R depends on the specific 
properties of the set X. 
Unanimity has a central place in ranking theory and practice. If every expert prefers y to x, 
then the group should prefer y to z (see Pareto’s principle [2]). Let us define the relation 
<U C X x X, as 
<u=<1n...n<,. 
The relation -QJ will be called unanimous preference. Unanimous preference is always a partial 
order (since all <i are partial orders), although it is not necessarily a weak order. The following 
corollary follows immediately from the definition of <u and the second constraint on R. 
COROLLARY 2.1. 
(1) vx,y E x. (x <1 y A ... Ax <m y) #X <i-J y. 
(2) QJ C R. 
We will require that the group ranking <9 satisfies <u C c9. 
3. APPROXIMATION OF RANKING RELATIONS 
BY PREFERENCE ORDERS 
As we mentioned above, the ranking relation R may not be a partial order. Our goal is to 
find a relation <s which is not only a weak order, but also “the best” approximation of R. This 
will be done in two steps. First, we will find <E+, “the best” partial order approximation of R. 
Next, we will discuss various weak order approximations of <g+. 
The problem is that the set X is believed to be partially ordered, but the data acquisition 
process is so influenced by informational noise, imprecision, randomness, or expert ignorance, 
that the collected data R is only some relation on X. We may say that R gives a fuzzy picture, 
and to focus it, we must do some pruning and/or extending. If R is not a partial order, then 
either it is not reflexive, or it is not transitive, or both. Suppose that R is not transitive. This 
could be seen as a limitation of the discriminatory power of the data acquisition process. Let us 
define the relation R+ = U,“=, Ri, where R i-t’ = Ri o R, and o denotes composition of relations. 
Evidently R c R+ and Rf is transitive. If R is transitive, then R+ = R. The relation R+ may 
not be irreflexive. If R+ is not irreflexive, we have 3x, y E X. xR+y A yR+x. Such a situation 
could be interpreted as a side effect of the data noise, uncertainty, randomness, etc. 
PROPOSITION 3.1. [8]. Let Q C X x X be a transitive relation. Define: 3: <Q y ti xQy~ -y/&x. 
The relation <Q is a partial order (i.e., it is irrefiexive and transitive). I 
The relation <R+, defined as x <R+ y -+ xR+y A lyR+x, will be called a partial order 
approximation of (ran/&g relation) R. We have <R+ & Rf, and if R+ is irreflexive, then 
R+ = <R+ 
COROLLARy 3.2. cu C RER+. I 
However, if R+ is not irreflexive, it may happen that <u \ <R+ # 0, so <u may be not included 
in <R+. 
Let us define <E+ as the smallest partial order satisfying the following constraint: 
<U u <R+c <;+. 
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PROPOSITION 3.3. (-+ u cR+)+ = <E+. 
PROOF. (<a u <R+)+ is evidently the smallest transitive relation containing <u u cR+. It 
suffices to show that (<u U <R+)+ is h-reflexive. Suppose it is not, i.e., 3s,y E X such that 
x(<u U <~+)+y A y(<u U <n+)+x. This means there are n > 0, 0 5 k < n, xc,. . . , zn E X, 
x0 = x, Xk = y, and Qr,. . . ,Q, C X x X, such that 
~oQlxlQwz.. . Xk-l&kxk . . . xn-1Qnxor 
where Qi is either <U or <R+. Both <U and <R+ are transitive; therefore, at least one Qi, say 
Q&J, must be equal to <R+, i.e., Qi,, = <R+. Because <r~ C R+ and <R+ 2 R+, all Qi C R+, 
so we have V&j < n. xiR+xj /\xjR+xi. In particular, xio-~R+xio Ax~~R+x~~-~, a contradiction 
since Qio = <R+ and <R+ is defined as x <R+ y M xR+y A ~yR+x. Hence, (<v U <R+)+ is 
irreflexive. I 
The relation <g+ will be called the proper partial order approtimation of the ranking relation R. 
If <u c <R+ then <R+ = <;+. 
PROPOSITION 3.4. Vx, y E X. z <g+ y * -, yRx. 
PROOF. Suppose 3x,y E X. x <$+ y j yRx. This means there are n > 1, xc,. . . ,z, E X, 
xo=x,xk=y,Ql,... ,Q,, C X x X, such that 
xoQ152.. . xn-1QnxoRx0, 
where Qi is either <U or <R+. Since yRx j -y <u x, then at least one Qi, say Qio, must be 
equal to <R+, i.e., Qio = <R+. But all Qi 2 R+, SO we have Vi,j 5 n. xiR+xj A XjR’xi. In 
particular, xi,-lR+xi, A xioR+xi,-l which is a contradiction since Qi,, = <A and <i is defined 
as x <R+ y & xR+y A ~yR+x. I 
If <;+ is a weak order, we can set cs = <i+. The property Vx, y E X. x cs y j -yRx can 
be interpreted as a weaker version of the Arrow’s Axiom of Binary Relevance (see [2] for details). 
If <;+ is not a weak order, we need to find a “good” weak order approximation, To do this, 
we will follow the approach suggested in [7]. 
Let us assume that set X is believed to be weakly ordered (by, for example, a group ranking 
relation <9), but the discriminatory power of the data acquisition process, which seeks to uncover 
this order, is limited. For example, experts may not always know enough about the problem and 
may make educated guesses or even select choices at random, the number of experts may be 
insufficient, or instruments may not be precise enough, etc. The acquired data establish only 
a partial order <P which is a partial picture of the underlying order. We seek, however, an 
extension process which is expected to identify correctly the ordered pairs that are not part of 
the data. To formulate this problem in a formal way, we need a new concept. To simplify the 
notation. let $, C X x X be a partial order defined as cP = <g+. Let us define zp C X x X 
as follows: 
x=,y~(vzEX.z~px~z-,y)Vx=y. 
Various properties of wP are analyzed in [7]. We need to recall only one here. 
PROPOSITION 3.5. [7]. A partial order cP is weak if and only if x cp y w x wP y v x = y. @ 
It is worthwhile noting that weak order extensions reflect the fact that if x zp y, then all 
reasonable methods for extending cP will have x equivalent to y in the extension, since there is 
nothing in the data that distinguishes between them (for details, see [7]). 
We will say that a weak order <w C X x X is a proper weak order extension of cP if and only 
if 
(~:$,y*x<~y) and (~~~y~x-~y~x=yy). 
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If X is finite, then for every partial order <pr there always exists a proper weak extension. 
If c+ is weak, then its only weak extension is <w = cP. If <P if not weak, there is usually 
more than one such extension. We will examine three such extensions. Let vi : X - Integers, 
i = 1,2,3, be the following (value) functions for all 2 E X: 
(1) fJl(~) = lb I 2 <P Yll, 
(2) ‘uz(z:) = NY I Y <P zll, 
(3) 7J3(2) = MY I z <P YII - NY I Y <P ZII. 
Let us define <wi C X x X, i = 1,2,3, a~ follows: 
l Vx,y E X. 2 q,,i y ti vi(x) < vi(y), if i = 1,3, and 
l vx, y E x. x -&I2 y * vz(z) > VZ(Y), 
where < is the standard total order of integers. 
PROPOSITION 3.6. For i = 1,2,3, the relation < Wi is a proper weak order extension of CP. 
PROOF. Since z <,,,i y % Q(Z) < vi(y), i = 1,2,3, then all <wi are weak orders. The following 
properties imply <wui are also proper extensions. For every finite partial order <p, and every 21, 
x2 : (MY I x1 <P Y/)1 # 1151 I 3x2 <P YIN ” (NY I Y <P x111 # KY I Y <P x2)1) # x1 <P x2” 
x2 <p Xl. I 
The weak order <w3 comes from [7], while zlzui and <w2 correspond to the left- and right- 
normal forms for partially commutative monoids (cf. [9]). M ore algorithms for finding various 
proper weak extensions are presented in [7]. The choice of an appropriate weak order extension 
depends on the problem considered. If someone is looking for “the best objects,” the order <wi 
seems to be the appropriate choice. For locating “the troublemakers” (that is, for example, 
controversial or extreme opinions), the order <w2 is more promising, while <ws corresponds to 
“the safe opinions.” 
Approximation of partial orders by weak orders is extremely useful in knowledge-based systems 
because of the weak order extensions. Not only are they easy to implement (usually a count of 
elements satisfying some conditions), but flexible in terms of fitness to the situation such as stress 
on precision, cautiousness in making decision, reliability, or even hunt for extremes. What else 
may a knowledge engineer dream of? 
The constructions presented above are independent of the form of R. They can be applied to 
any (irreflexive) relation R C X x X. Hence, even if the definition of the ranking relation R 
would change, the results of this section would hold. This is important from the knowledge-based 
system viewpoint, since for some specific cases, the definitions of the ranking relations may vary 
from what we have proposed in this paper. 
4. THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM AND ITS COMPLIANCE 
WITH ARROW’S CONSISTENCY RULES 
Let X be our set of objects and IR = {<I, . . . , cm} be a set of individual rankings of X. We 
propose the following algorithm for finding the group ranking <,: 
l construct a ranking relation R over IR (as shown in Section 2); 
l construct the proper partial order of R as <g+ (as shown in Section 3); 
l if <E+ is a weak order, then define a group ranking as <9 = <g+; 
l otherwise <9 = <u where <w is one of the proper weak order extensions of <K+. 
To illustrate the above algorithm, let us consider eight objects (in this case criteria) X = 
{a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h}, four experts, and their individual rankings IR = {<I, <2, <s, <4} (provided 
by Table 1). 
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The individual rankings <i’s are, respectively, represented by the following step-sequences: 
Table 1. Rankings provided by the individual experts. 
The ranking relation R (defined as a simple majority voting, R = Rsmy) and its transitive 
closure R+ are illustrated in Figure 1. The unanimous preference relation <u, the partial order 
approximation <R+ , and the proper partial order approximation <g+ are presented in Figure 2. 
ReMion R Rclntion Ilf 
Figure 1. Diagraphs of relations derived from Table 1 (R is assumed to be the simple 
/a 
majority voting, R = J&“). 
.a 
,e 
:;.f .b .d .g 
th 
:c 
Relation <u Relation <R+ Relation <$ 
Figure 2. Hasse diagrams of relations <u, <R+, and <g+ 
Note that R is not transitive, R+ is not reflexive, <U is not included in <g+, and <g+ is not 
weak. In Figure 2, Hasse diagrams are used to represent the partial orders <u, <R+, and <K+. 
For R, *cc - l y means xRy, for R+, l x - l y means xR+y , and ax -my means xRi y A yR+x. 
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The value functions VI(Z), VZ(Z), and Q(Z) applied to <g+ give weak orders ~~1, <we, 
and cw3, which are, respectively, represented by the following step-sequences: 
Table 2 illustrates the three weak extensions of <g+ constructed in Figure 2. We may define 
c9 as cui, i = 1,2,3, or any other proper weak order extension of <K+. 
Table 2. Three weak extensions of the partial order <g+ in Figure 2 
It is necessary to analyze the compliance of our algorithm with the consistency rules proposed 
in [l]. The six consistency rules are called, respectively: 
(1) weak ordering, 
(2) nontriviality, 
(3) universal domain, 
(4) binary relevance, 
(5) Pareto’s principle for strict preference, 
(6) no dictatorship. 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem proves that there is no constitution (or social function) which 
allows a group ranking <9 to be defined from IR = { < 1, . . . , <m} in a manner consistent with all 
of the above listed axioms (l)-(6). The detailed presentation and analysis of the axioms (l)-(6) 
is in [2]. Axioms (3), (4), and sometimes even (1) may involve controversy (compare [2]) as 
they fit well in the framework of original applications, but in general they tend to be too strong. 
They seem to follow from the fact that people are generally quite reluctant to admit any kind of 
incomparability and usually prefer any preference, even if it is a random choice. This phenomenon 
may be observed to a higher degree in cultures rooted in Greek-Roman tradition which invented 
the linear (totally ordered) concept of the time continuum. Cultures without this tradition seem 
to be less reluctant to admit incomparability (fuzziness of the Universe) (also compare [lo]). We 
consider incomparability as a natural phenomenon which together with nondeterminism (see [ll] 
and the closing remarks in Conclusions of this paper) really occurs in reality. Axioms (5), (6) 
(and sometimes (1)) tend to be valid in almost every ranking scheme. Axiom (2) has a cosmetic 
meaning. Clearly our algorithm is not in contradiction with Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, since 
we do not assume the validity of all of Arrow’s axioms. However, one may note that for a vast 
majority of practical applications in knowledge-based systems, all important Arrow’s axioms are 
satisfied. This makes our algorithm useful. 
THEOREM 4.1. If 1x1 2 2 and m 2 3, then for every ranking RF every proper weak order 
extension $ of <g+ satisfies Arrow’s Axioms (l), (2), (5), and (6). 
PROOF. Axioms (1) and (2) are trivially satisfied. Axiom (5) follows from +J C <g+ C cs. 
Axiom (6), “No dictatorship,” means that there is no individual whose preferences automatically 
become the preferences of the group independently of the preferences of the other group members 
(for a detailed discussion, see [2]). Suppose Expert 1 is a “dictator” and his/her preference is <l. 
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Let us define the individual ranking <i, i # 1, and i 5 m, as x <i y e y <I x. Evidently each 
<i is a weak order, <u is empty, and since m 2 3, x <I y V 1xRy. Note that R,,, = <jr i # 1, 
so every ranking relation R satisfies R 2 <i, i # 1, and consequently R+ G <i, i # 1. This 
also means that R+ is a partial order, i.e., R+ = <R+, and that R+ fl <I = 8. Since <IJ = 0, 
then R+ = <R+ = <’ R+r so cg = R+, i.e., c9 n ~1 = 0. Because <I is not empty, therefore, 
<s # <I, i.e., Expert 1 is not a “dictator.” I 
Axioms (3) and (4), as well as the property Vx, y E X. x <9 y j -yRx, a weaker version of 
Axiom (4), may not be satisfied. For instance, no proper extension of <g+ in Table 2 satisfies 
the property Vx, y E X. x <g y + -yRx. 
THEOREM 4.2. If 1x1 2 2 and m 2 3, then for every ranking relation R, the relation -c~ defined 
as <9 = <g+ satisfies Arrow’s Axioms (2), (5), and (6) and the property Vx, y E X. x <g y =S 
~yRx, a weaker version of Arrow’s Axiom (4). 
PROOF. Axiom (2) is trivially satisfied. Axiom (5) follows from <II C <K+. The proof of 
Axiom (6) is the same as in Theorem 4.1. The property Vx, y E X. x <9 y =S 7yRx comes from 
Proposition 3.4. I 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
There are various ways of formulating priorities: trade-off methods, verbal statements, ratings, 
and rankings. Voogd [12] reports that the ranking method is preferred by the majority of inter- 
viewed experts. Under some circumstances, it might be attractive to use a method that enables 
experts to express their priorities in a more refined way. 
In the authors9 opinion, the property Vx, y E X. x cs y d 7yRx is more important than the 
weak ordering requirement for c9. The requirement that <s is a partial, or eventually an interval 
order, seems to suffice when we assume that incomparability exists as natural reality rather than 
it is a consequence of incomplete knowledge. 
Werner Heisenberg in many discussions with Albert Einstein stated that nondeterminism ex- 
ists in the Universe and that the quantum theory is just a model of nondeterminism. Einstein’s 
position was that all nondeterminism comes from a deficiency of knowledge about the phenom- 
ena under consideration. Modern science is inclined to substantiate the validity of Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle rather than Einstein’s position on nondeterminism (see [ll]). The uncer- 
tainty principle has profound implications for the way in which we view the world. Its relevance 
to ranking is quite important. It may not be reasonable to insist that everything could or even 
should be ordered. The assumption of the existence of noncomparable criteria is more natural 
and practical. In fact, a pairwise comparisons method (see [2,4,5,13,14] utilizes this approach 
and uses a designated value (usually one) for denoting equal importance or lack of knowledge 
about two compared objects. 
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